Public Good occasional paper #6
©1997 by Paul de Armond
Abstract: The present occasion calls for some clarification of the actors and concepts involved in millenarian and right-wing terrorism. Anti-terrorism is the reduction of terrorist violence by non-violent means. Counter-terrorism is fighting terrorism as a limited form of low- intensity conflict. The two strategies are not opposed to each other, but one is the subset of the other. Examples of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism are presented and the theoretical underpinnings of each are examined.
Terrorism is the extra-legal use of violence to attain social or political goals. The use of violence can be the direct use of force or the indirect use of force through fear. A threat without the means to carry it out is still the use of violence, if that threat is credible to a reasonable person (e.g., a bomb threat.) This definition of terrorism includes actors who employ a posture of preparedness for the use of violence as part of their social or political stance.
Millenarian and right-wing ideologies drive the largest terrorist movements in America. For the purposes of this discussion, "terrorism" describes the activities of these movements and not other groups with different motives. Millenarian and right-wing terrorist movements are essentially theological movements seeking a literally apocalyptic transformation of the world. These movements are not monolithic, but they share a particularly doom-struck world view and have been able to cooperate on strategies, tactics and resources across movement boundaries.
In the United States, terrorism is treated as a criminal justice issue. The lead agency is the FBI or local law enforcement agencies, operating under the authority of the U.S. Department of Justice or states' Attorneys General. Other federal departments involved in terrorism cases include Treasury, Commerce, Energy, Agriculture and Defense. With the limited exception of the Treasury Department's jurisdiction over weapons and explosives, these other agencies concern with terrorism is of a strictly defensive nature.
Few states have laws specifically aimed at terrorist activities, but many have laws retrospectively increasing the penalty for crimes committed with proven terrorist motives (e.g., malicious harassment statutes.) This is quite different from laws prospectively prohibiting the use of violence to achieve political or social goals.
In Washington State, for instance, the only relevant law specifically applicable to terrorist activities is the treason statute (RCW 9.82 Treason.) Many states have "subversive organization" or "criminal syndicalism" laws, such as Washington's RCW 9.05 Anarchy and Sabotage and RCW 9.81 Subversive Activities statutes. The legislative intent behind these statutes was suppressing labor organizing and responding to the post-WWII anti-Communist hysteria. Most, if not all, of these statutes are facially invalid because of vagueness, overbreadth, and violation of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.
Military security services are involved in only cases where the military is either the target or the base of operation and supply for terrorists. Under federal law, military forces or intelligence agencies may not conduct operations outside of their own installations. In some limited circumstances, the military or intelligence agencies provide counter-terrorists with support services, such as communication, transportation and explosives disposal.
The overall federal policy treats terrorism as crime. This makes terrorism a criminal justice issue, rather than a military or political issue. Most of the federal actions against terrorism are law enforcement investigations. These investigations frequently have para- or quasi-military action as the final act leading to the capture or destruction of terrorists. Suspected terrorists who are subject to indictment and trial by the criminal justice system.
A survey of federal terrorism indictments during 1982 through 1989 showed 46.2% of the charges involved conspiracy or racketeering resulting in a 73.1% success rate in prosecution, 27.7% involved firearms or explosives (90.9% success), and 11.9% involved theft or fraud (65.7% success), while only 1.6% involved treason, sedition or subversion (27.3% success), and 1.4% involved homicide (outcomes not reported). Other charges accounted for the remaining 11.1% of the counts.
The non-political nature of federal prosecutions is striking. Most of the crimes are not specific to terrorism. The high success rate for firearms and explosives is due to these being crimes of possession, while the failure in treason, sedition, and subversion prosecutions is due to the difficulty of convincing juries of terrorists' motives and intent.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and pluralities also play a considerable role in confronting terrorism. Unlike government institutions, NGOs are forbidden from engaging in para- or quasi-military action. The closest that NGOs come to military activities is the use of private security or fortification for defense against terrorist attacks. All other activities are of a political, social, legal or economic nature. As will be seen below, the range of these activities is far broader than that of government actors.
Broadly speaking, there are four types of NGOs confronting millenarian or right-wing terrorism:
The first group is typified by human rights groups, researchers, journalists, policy analysts, etc.; the second by cultural, religious or secular groups that have been repeatedly attacked by terrorists: civil rights groups, abortion providers, minority churches, etc.; the third by the targets of terrorism: gays and lesbians, people of color, federal employees, good government groups, environmentalists, etc.; and the fourth group by the public: average citizens who are involved in community groups or local politics, legislators, local officials, "main-line" churches, etc.
These four groups differ by the depth and extent of their knowledge of millenarian and right- wing terrorism and the active or passive stance that they take in confronting it.
The actions of NGOs in confronting terrorism are very different from those of law enforcement agencies. Most NGO activities consist of gathering and disseminating information: research and education. Public acts by NGOs rely on methods derived from the non-violent Civil Rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s: speeches, protest marches, demonstrations, rallies and meetings.
The guiding strategy of federal law enforcement agencies for confronting terrorism is "counter-terrorism." Counter-terrorism is essentially a defensive military strategy. It consists of gathering intelligence, maintaining operational security, and applying force to capture or kill opponents. Counter-terrorism is a strategy of repression or suppression. The aim is not to eliminate root causes or eliminate terrorism, but only to "bring the situation under control." Counter-terrorism's goals and values clearly fall within the classic definition of military defensive strategy as "the stronger form with the negative object."
Counter-terrorism strategy contains a number of weaknesses. Perhaps the greatest weakness is due to the fact that as a military strategy, its basic assumptions are in opposition to the goals and values of civil society. Counter-terrorism's emphasis on "suppressing the threat" highlights the defensive goal of weakening or destroying terrorist organizations. It does nothing to strengthen civil society, but only seeks to eliminate threats to civil order. Counter terrorism's potential for eroding freedom has been and remains a grave concern to civil libertarians.
Counter-terrorism can cross the line into unconscionable, illegal, or extra-legal actions. The tragedies at Waco and Ruby Ridge provide recent examples of the first two instances. The COINTELPRO-style harassment and attempted repression of the "sanctuary" movement and the Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) by the Reagan administration are recent examples of extra-legal counter-terrorism actions directed against a law-abiding social justice group. These abuses occur when the dividing lines between the laws of civil society and the laws of war become blurred in the heat of action or are ignored by policy makers.
Counter-terrorism's lesser weakness concerns the inability of counter-terrorist institutions to engage in propaganda or psychological warfare activities to deal with terrorist propaganda. The over-riding limitation is the legal restrictions on such acts by executive branch agencies, but a deeper reason resides in counter-terrorism's defensive orientation towards operational security and tactical intelligence. This orientation leads to policies which greatly restrict the release of information. As a result, terrorist actors who engage in propaganda activities are virtually unopposed by counter-terrorist actors. The spectacle of terrorist spokesmen getting widespread exposure in the national media while counter-terrorist experts seethe in silent fury is a common occurrence.
Counter-terrorism can be an appropriate strategy -- given the assumption that terrorism is nothing but a variety of violent crime. Recent changes in policy and tactics by federal counter- terrorism forces show that steps are being taken to control the type of abuses described above and to broaden the scope of action beyond the military sphere by incorporating political tactics such as negotiation. Counter-terrorism is a necessary part of any broad policy initiative in confronting terrorism, if only for the reason that the most violent terrorist groups seek to escalate conflict to the maximum levels of violence permitted by their resources.
The guiding strategy of NGOs confronting terrorism is "anti-terrorism." Anti-terrorism is an expansive strategy of democratic social and political change by non-violent means. The goal of anti-terrorism is to reduce the level of violence sufficiently so that normal means of social and political conflict resolution can come into play. Anti-terrorism tactics consist of gathering information and disseminating it broadly, promoting public discourse, lobbying policy-makers to encourage violence-reduction policies and legislation, conducting civil litigation against terrorist actors, and organizing social institutions to accomplish these functions. Anti-terrorism is a strategy of expanding democracy to eliminate the causes and resources enabling terrorism.
Anti-terrorism's greatest weakness is its vulnerability to terrorist attack. Low level terrorism inhibits anti-terrorists from mobilizing resources. If the level of terrorist violence is high, anti- terrorist actors are extremely restricted in their ability to operate.
When anti-terrorist movements are targeted by high levels of terrorist violence, they are faced with three choices: to enlist state counter-terrorism to suppress the violence, to engage in extra-legal terrorism or counter-terrorism themselves, or to persist in the face of casualties. The first two options are ruled out when terrorists operate with the sanction of the state, as occurred during the Civil Rights movement and is occurring now with cultural minorities, homosexuals, immigrants, abortion providers and environmentalists. As occurred during the anti-war movement during the 1960's, deranged actors can suddenly "snap" from non-violent anti- terrorism to violent terrorism.
This leaves committed anti-terrorists only the third option: non-violence and casualties. When casualties become too high, as occurred in Tienamen Square, the Hungarian revolt or Nazi Germany, anti-terrorism fails as a strategy. In the United States, anti-terrorism has generally been successful, but the long-term outcome of any ongoing violent conflict is not assured.
Anti-terrorism's lesser area of risk is actually a strength. Because anti-terrorist actions involve the dissemination of information, errors in research can lead to the publication of false or incorrect information. Anti-terrorist actors are constantly aware of the dangers associated with making public statements which could be libelous or defamatory. Where terrorist actors become the target of libel or defamation, there are only two tactics available to the terrorists: civil litigation or counter-propaganda. Both are ineffective from the terrorist viewpoint. Civil litigation requires actors who can divorce themselves from illegal activities, thus conceding a key anti- terrorist goal. Counter-propaganda can be disastrously ineffective, since it causes wider dissemination of the information that terrorists wish to suppress.
In the largest sense, anti-terrorism is nothing more than the active practice of participatory democracy and the communication of core democratic rights and values to society.
The resulting three-way struggle is far more complex than has been portrayed in the popular media. Rather than the simplistic dualism of terrorist against state, anti-government kooks against the establishment, or other cartoonishly monolithic representations, the real situation involves six relationships which interact in complex and non-linear ways.
The key to the situation lies in the single component that is common to all: information and information flows. Anti-terrorism strategy depends on bi-directional flows of information through research and education. Counter-terrorism, with its emphasis on operational and tactical security, collects but rarely disseminates information. The significant difference between anti- terrorism's strategic approach and counter-terrorism's tactical approach to information places anti-terrorist actors in a superior position in the overall conflict.
The relationship between counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism and terrorism is much like the children's game of rock, paper, scissors. Terrorism is the scissors -- its violence can cut the paper of anti-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is like the rock -- it can smash the violence of terrorism. And anti-terrorism is like the paper -- its comprehensive overview covers the rock.
Fig 1.
The environment of terrorism, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism may be viewed as continuous or discrete. The continuous view in Fig. 1 shows the entire event space. This view is useful for dealing with movements, broad policy initiatives, and other complex entities. The discrete view in Fig. 2 is a simplification of the event space into the eight octants. It is useful for categorizing events that have clearly defined boundaries, such as a single specific act.
Fig. 2.
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